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New York Law School
This article considers the implications of assisted outpatient commitment laws
(OPC), with specific focus on New York’s “Kendra’s Law” through the lens of
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ). In this article, the author offers perspectives on the
relationship between involuntary civil commitment, outpatient commitment, and the
concept of the “least restrictive alternative”; considers pertinent empirical research,
and looks at OPC’s controversial relationship to forced drugging. Here, the civil
libertarian critique is briefly considered, as well as the MacArthur Research Net-
work research. Finally, the author looks closely at Kendra’s Law, providing a brief
overview of the law itself, and identifying some “pressure points” and pivotal issues,
and considers the TJ implications of Kendra’s Law, to determine how it “fits” into
the public’s “take” on all of mental disability law.
One of the most remarkable recent developments in legal scholarship has
been the extent to which Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ)1 has flourished in a
wide variety of legal areas, spanning the academy from gay rights to contracts
This article is adapted from a paper presented at the Third Conference of the International
Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Cincinnati, Ohio, May 2001. Portions of it draw on papers
presented at the Association of American Law Schools’ annual meeting (San Francisco, January
2001), the International Academy of Law and Mental Health’s annual meeting (Siena, Italy, July
2000), a Grand Rounds Seminar at Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center (New York City, December
2000), and at the New York State Office of Court Administration Court Update conferences in
Rochester, New York (November 1999), Saratoga, New York (January 2000), and Rochester, New
York (October 2000).
I thank Jenna Anderson for her exceptional research assistance, and Bruce Winick for his
helpful and insightful comments.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michael L. Perlin, New York
Law School, 57 Worth Street, New York, New York 10013. E-mail: mperlin@nyls.edu
1 Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model by which we can assess the ultimate impact
of case law and legislation that affects mentally disabled individuals, studying the role of the law
as a therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers’ roles may
have either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences, and questioning whether such rules,
procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, while
not subordinating due process principles. Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw’” The
Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52
ALABAMA L. REV. 193, 228 (2000). See generally, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT 121, 122 (David Wexler ed. 1990) (THERAPEUTIC AGENT); ESSAYS IN THERA-
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds. 1991); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds.
1996) [hereinafter THERAPEUTIC KEY)]; THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL
HEALTH LAW (Bruce J. Winick ed. 1997); David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental
Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992.)
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law.2 I applaud this expansionism, and have no question in my mind that this has
been a salutary development—not simply for legal scholarship, but for legal
pedagogy, and, most important, for the practice of law.3
With that in mind, this paper returns to basic principles, and to the application
of TJ to mental disability law.4 I do this because the specific question that I am
addressing here—the implications of assisted outpatient commitment laws
(AOPC), with specific focus on New York’s “Kendra’s Law”5—appears to be a
particularly apt candidate for a TJ analysis.6
Kendra’s Law is one of those state-specific statutes whose impact will
inevitably extend beyond the one jurisdiction in which it is law. New York is far
from the first state to experiment with AOPC law7 (although that is something that
the unsuspecting reader would not know from the press coverage). However,
because of the sensational series of events that led to the introduction and passage
of the law—the vivid and horrifying facts of Kendra Webdale’s death, the tortured
life of her killer Andrew Goldstein, the saturation publicity given to the case8 and
the way it became the focal point for so much political maneuvering in Albany9—it
has developed a public “following” that none of its predecessors shared.10
2 See, e.g., Kay Kavanagh, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Deception Required Disclosure Denied, 1
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 142 (1995); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and
Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 445 (1994).
3 On how our teaching affects legal practice, see Michael L. Perlin, Stepping Outside the Box:
Viewing Your Client in a Whole New Light, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 65 (2000); Michael L. Perlin A Law
of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407 (2000) [Perlin, Healing].
4 See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000);
Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases of
Mental Disability Law, 20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & Crv. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994); Michael L. Perlin, et
al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons:
Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption? 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 80 (1995), reprinted in
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 1, at 739; Bruce Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 184 (1997); THERAPEUTIC AGENT, supra note 1; David Wexler
& Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy
Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991); Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993); David Finkelman & Thomas Grisso,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Idea to Application, 20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243
(1994); David Wexler, An Orientation to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 259 (1994); Bruce Sales & Daniel Shuman, Mental Health Law and Mental Health
Care: Introduction, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 172 (1994); David Wexler, Reflections on the Scope
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 220 (1995); Wexler, supra note 1; David
Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: New Directions in Law/Mental Health Scholarship, in MENTAL
HEALTH LAW: RESEARCH, POLICY AND SERVICES 357 (Bruce Sales & Saleem Shah eds. 1996).
5 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60.
6 For an overview of the proliferation of legal and behavioral issues that have been the recent
subject of therapeutic jurisprudence analyses, see 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 2D-3, at 534-41 (2d ed. 1998), and id. at 96-106 (2001 Supp.).
7 Id. at § 2C-7.3, at 491-99,
8 A “KENDRA WEBDALE” search on WESTLAW (database: PAPERS) reveals a universe of
205 articles (April 24, 2001).
9 See e.g., John Caher, Leaders Agree on Kendra’s Law, ALBANY TIMES-UNION (Aug. 4, 1999), at B2.
10 These laws, however, have been studied extensively. See infra text accompanying notes
31–48.
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Kendra’s Law’s day-to-day operationalization, the on-going constitutional
challenges,11 the law’s potential impact on the delivery of other mental health
services in the state, and—most important—the inevitability of a “mistake” (a
case in which denial of a Kendra’s Law commitment is followed by the commis-
sion of a notorious criminal act, or a case in which entry of a Kendra’s Law
commitment is followed by a patient developing neuroleptic malignant syndrome
or some other potentially-fatal antipsychotic drug side effect because of a misdi-
agnosis or an error in prescription or medication dispensation) all make it
inevitable that it will become the centerpiece of the next mental health law
debate.12
It is thus especially important that a discussion of Kendra’s Law also provide
a national perspective as well as background on OPC - and how, for decades, OPC
has been the paradigm trompe d’oeil illusion of mental disability law. In this paper
I will do the following: First, I will offer some perspectives on the relationship
between involuntary civil commitment and outpatient commitment, with a few
brief words about how all of this relates to the concept of the “least restrictive
alternative” (LRA).13 Then, I will consider some of the empirical research that has
been done on outpatient commitment laws in other jurisdictions—most notably,
North Carolina—and focus on both the issues that seemed to matter whether OPC
“worked” and on the impact OPC may have had on “revolving door” commit-
ments.14 After that, I will look at the most controversial aspect of outpatient
commitment: its relationship to forced drugging.15 Here, I will consider briefly the
civil libertarian critique of OPC/forced drugging laws; I will take a brief look at
some important recent developments, and I will also briefly mention the state-of-
the-art research done by the MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and
weigh some of its pertinent conclusions.16
Finally, I will look closely at Kendra’s Law. Here, I will provide a brief
overview of the law itself, and will identify some “pressure points” and pivotal
11 On some of the enforced medication issues that are at the core of Kendra’s Law, the NY
Court of Appeals has relied on state constitutional law so as to provide persons with mental
disabilities far more constitutional rights than they might receive under the federal constitution. See
Rivers v. Katz, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986).
12 On the way one vivid case inevitably overwhelms statistical data of hundreds or thousands
of other less vivid cases, see generally, Michael L. Perlin, “There’s No Success like Failure/and
Failure’s No Success at All”: Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U. L. REV.
1247, 1256 (1998); Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From Me”: The
Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82
IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1417 (1997).
See generally, National Ass’n of State Mental Health Program Directors, Technical Report on
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment 15 (Aug. 2001) (Technical Report) (“Recent attention on
[OPC] has been fueled by concerns with societal violence and inflamed by high profile cases. Policy
changes should not be based solely on these few cases, but instead should derive from a firm
foundation of research and experience”).
13 See infra Part I.
14 See infra Part II.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See e.g., VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT (John
Monahan & Henry Steadman, eds. 1994).
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issues in the law.17 I believe that there are ambiguities in some of the “pressure
points” that cry out for resolution, and that the appellate disposition of some of the
pivotal issues will provide some clues as to the ultimate “real life” impact of
Kendra’s Law.18 Finally, I will consider the TJ implications of Kendra’s Law, in
part, in an effort to determine how it “fits” into the public’s “take” on all of mental
disability law.19
I. Involuntary Civil Commitment and Outpatient Commitment20
A. The “LRA” Roots
Trailblazing constitutional involuntary civil commitment cases such as Les-
sard v. Schmidt—the 1972 Wisconsin federal court decision that struck down that
state’s old civil commitment code21 and served as the model for involuntary civil
commitment revisions in nearly every state22—first applied the concept of the
“LRA” to the involuntary civil commitment process.23 The theory was this: As
“the most basic and fundamental right” is “the right to be free from unwanted
restraint,” the court concluded that “persons suffering from the condition of being
mentally ill, but who are not alleged to have committed any crime, cannot be
totally deprived of their liberty if there are less drastic means for achieving the
same basic goal.”24
The Lessard court placed the burden for exploring alternatives to institution-
alization on the party recommending full-time involuntary hospitalization, and
ordered that that party prove:
(a) what alternatives are available; (b) what alternatives were investigated; and (c)
why the investigated alternatives were not deemed suitable. These alternatives
include voluntary or court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in a hos-
pital, night treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody of a friend or relative,
placement in a nursing home, referral to a community mental health clinic, and
home health aide services.25
Other jurisdictions subsequently adopted Lessard’s reasoning in their com-
mitment codes. Moreover, other courts quickly expanded the scope of the LRA
doctrine beyond involuntary civil commitment decision making26 to include
17 See infra Part IV.
18 See infra Part V.
19 See supra Part VI.
20 This section is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin, “Their Promises of Paradise”:
Institutional Segregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and Olmstead v. L.C., 37 HOUS. L. REV.
999, 1010–16 (2000).
21 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
22 See generally, 1 PERLIN, supra note 6, § 2A-4.4a, at 131–32.
23 Id., § 2C-5.3a, at 420–22 (2d ed. 1998). The LRA principle had previously been applied in
a mental disability law context in the statutory case of Lake v. Cameron, 364 F. 2d 657 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
24 Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1096.
25 Id.
26 On the issue of the patient’s right to a written treatment plan, see e.g., Maxwell, 703 P.2d
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regulation of the conditions of confinement,27 the availability of treatment,28 and
the right of a patient to refuse treatment.29
B. The First Generation of Studies
A major study commissioned by the National Center for State Courts listed
these factors as essential in any assessment of an LRA determination:
the environmental restrictiveness of the treatment setting; the psychological or
physical restrictiveness of behavioral, chemical, or biological treatment; clinical
variables, including the person’s behavior as it relates to the legal criteria for
involuntary commitment; the relative risks and benefits of treatment alternatives;
the family and community support available in the person’s environment; the
quality or likely effectiveness of the alternative care and treatment; the duration of
treatment; the likelihood that a person may pose a risk to public safety; the
availability, cost, and accessibility of alternative treatment and care; the likelihood
of the person’s cooperation or compliance with the conditions of alternative
treatment programs; and mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing that compli-
ance.30
Thus, any TJ consideration of Kendra’s Law—or any other contemporaneous
AOT law—must be considered in the context of these factors. Expound on this,
perhaps use an example or case study about why these are intrinsically related to
TJ.
II. Early OPC Laws
Early OPC laws flowed from the application of these LRA principles in an
effort to narrow—not widen—the net of those subject to involuntary civil com-
mitment. For example, the North Carolina law—universally seen as the paradig-
matic outpatient commitment statute—allowed “an examining mental health
professional to recommend outpatient commitment in the case of a mentally ill
574 (Ariz. App. 1985) (order for treatment which committed patient to program of combined
in-patient and out-patient treatment was void, absent showing that court was presented with and
approved written treatment plan; order vacated); see also In re J.M.R., 505 A.2d 662 (Vt. 1986) (trial
court could not continue involuntary treatment on non-hospitalized basis for indeterminate time,
absent any finding that patient was dangerous to himself or others, or would become so if treatment
plan was discontinued). But see In re Harhut, 367 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court
erred in prescribing specific treatment programs, in ordering the county to prepare treatment reports
and the hospital to submit a program plan to the court, and in ordering the county to create
community placements in a commitment order).
27 See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1101, on remand,
691 F.2d 634 (3d Cir. 1982). For a subsequent case, see Matter of James, 547 N.E.2d, 759, 761–62
(III. App. 1989) (absence of report on appropriateness and availability of alternative treatment
facilities and preliminary treatment plan required commitment reversal).
28 See, e.g., Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980)(vacated, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
29 See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), suppl., 476 F. Supp. 1294
(D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand,
720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
30 Ingo Keilitz et al, Least Restrictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Translating Concepts
Into Practice, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 696 (1985).
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patient31 “capable of surviving safely in the community with available supervi-
sion from family, friends, or others,”32 where the individual is “in need of
treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration which would
predictably result in dangerousness,”33 and where the patient is unable to make an
informed decision “to seek voluntary treatment or comply with recommended
treatment.”34
Several studies examined the actual effect of this form of commitment.35 In
one study, researchers who examined all court-ordered outpatient commitments in
one court for a two year period found a high success rate for the patients
involved;36 fewer than 13% of patients involved were rehospitalized during the
time frame,37 leading the researchers to conclude that such commitment was
effective in providing treatment and control of dangerousness38 (while enabling
respondents to maintain their roles and networks in familiar surroundings),39 and
31 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1)(a) (1997).
32 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1)(b) (1997). Cf. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975).
33 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1)(c) (1997). See, e.g., Matter of Mental Condition of
W.R.B., 411 N.W.2d 142, 143 (Wis. App. 1987), rev. den., 416 N.W. 2d 297 (Wis. 1987):
The clear intent of the legislature . . . was to avoid the “revolving door” phenomenon whereby
there must be proof of a recent overt act to extend the commitment but because the patient
was still under treatment, no overt acts occurred and the patient was released only to commit
a dangerous act and be recommitted. The result was a vicious circle of treatment, release,
overt act, recommitment.
Statutes typically look at medication compliance as one of the criteria for invoking OPC, see,
e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(13)(dm) (1998), text effective until Dec. 1, 2001 (OPC permissible
if court finds dangerousness of patient “is likely to be controlled with appropriate medication
administered on an outpatient basis”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-201(b)(2) (1997) (allowing OPC
where patient is subject to the “obligation to participate in any medically appropriate outpatient
treatment, including . . . medication . . . ”), and case law seems to explicitly endorse this use of OPC,
see, e.g., In re Anderson, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546, 550 (App. 1977) (medication an appropriate condition
of outpatient treatment). Compare In re Richardson, 481 A.2d 473, 479 n.5 (D.C. 1984) (“[n]ot
every instance of the outpatient’s failure to take prescribed medication or attend therapy sessions
justifies the conclusion that he is not cooperating with the treatment program”).
34 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1)(d) (1997).
35 See Robert Miller, Commitment to Outpatient Commitment: A National Survey, 36 HOSP. &
COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 265, 266 (1985) (national survey revealed that two-thirds of the jurisdictions
that permit outpatient commitment use it as an alternative to inpatient treatment in fewer than 5%
of commitments). See also Parker & Knoll, Partial Hospitalization: An Update, 147 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 156 (1990) (discussing relatively low utilization of partial hospitalization as treatment
modality); Gerry McCafferty & Jeanne Dooley, Involuntary Civil Commitment: An Update, 14
MENT. & PHYS. DIS. L. REP. 277 (1990) (reviewing recent outpatient statutes); Ingo Keilitz,
Empirical Studies and Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 14 MENT. & PHYS. DIS. L. Rep. 368
(1990) (research studies).
36 Virginia Hiday & Rodney Goodman, The Least Restrictive Alternative to Involuntary
Hospitalization, Outpatient Commitment: Its Use and Effectiveness, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 81
(1982).
37 Id. at 81.
38 Id. at 91.
39 Id.
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was “not only more rational in terms of human costs, but also . . . more rational in
terms of financial costs to the taxpayer.”40
On the other hand, another North Carolina survey conducted by other re-
searchers reported that the new statute had little impact on the use of outpatient
commitment,41 reporting that, while the number of cases in which hospital staff
recommended outpatient treatment significantly increased after the effective date
of statutory change.42 The percentage of cases studied in which outpatient
commitment was ordered actually decreased slightly.43
A follow-up study by the same researchers focused on several reasons why,
in their view, outpatient commitment had not become a particularly significant
“therapeutic modality”:44 (a) court reluctance to employ outpatient commitment
when “dangerousness” is a commitment criteria;45 (b) reluctance of community
facility staff to treat unwilling patients;46 (c) lack of interest by community
facility staff in outpatient commitment;47 and (d) lack of knowledge about the
procedures involved.48
40 Id. See Mark Munetz et al, The Effectiveness of Outpatient Civil Commitment, 46 PSYCHI-
ATRIC SERV. 1251 (1996) (when used “judiciously,” OPC “helpful tool in maintaining hospital
recidivists in the community”).
41 Robert Miller & Paul Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The
Result of the 1979 Statutory Changes, 60 N.C. L. REV. 985, 1013 (1982).
42 Id. at 1010 (staff recommended outpatient commitment for 44% of committed patients who
were committed to outpatient treatment prior to the law’s effective date, and 77% of those
committed afterward).
43 Id. (percentage dropped from 4.7% to 3.1%). The authors reported further that, of the
thirty-five outpatient commitment cases studied, only one satisfied all the requisite statutory
provisions. Id. at 1013, and see id. at n. 118.
44 Robert Miller & Paul Fiddleman, Outpatient Commitment: Treatment in the Least Restric-
tive Environment?, 35 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 147, 149 (1984).
45 Id. On the other hand, the researchers indicate that, in some circumstances, courts improperly
overutilize outpatient commitment “when the judge is convinced that further treatment is advisable
but feels that the legal evidence is insufficient to justify inpatient commitment,” using outpatient
commitment as a sort of plea bargain-compromise. Id.
46 Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 44, at 149. The authors see this reluctance as an outgrowth
of the increasing number of nonmedical personnel at such centers, see, e.g., Fink & Weinstein,
Whatever Happened to Psychiatry? The Deprofessionalization of Community Mental Health Cen-
ters, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 406 (1979), who are less comfortable with coerced treatment than are
physicians, see Mendel & Rapport, Determinants of the Decision for Psychiatric Hospitalization, 20
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 321 (1969), and also “less enthusiastic about forcing patients to come for
nonmedical treatment,” Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 44, at 150.
47 See Virginia Hiday & Teresa Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience with Outpatient
Commitment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 215, 230 (1987) (empirical study
suggests that extent of community mental health center “dedication to making [outpatient commit-
ment] work” important variable in success of outpatient commitment status).
48 Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 44, at 150; see also, Jeffrey Geller, Clinical Guidelines for
the Use of Involuntary Outpatient Treatment, 41 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 749 (1990). On this
point, Miller and Fiddleman concluded:
Until these entrenched attitudes change, outpatient commitment will not become a realistic
alternative to hospitalization. Despite legal sanctions, outpatient commitment is too easily
sabotaged to succeed without cooperation from all parties.
Id. at 151.
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B. More Recent Studies
The majority of the studies just referred to were done in the 1980’s. What can
be learned from the more recent studies? Perhaps the most interesting was one
done by Randy Borum and his colleagues investigating the beliefs of persons with
mental illness about the provisions and implications of outpatient commitment
laws.49 Borum questions “what obligations, if any, do clinicians have to educate
respondents about the actual provisions and limitations of their outpatient com-
mitment?”50 Borum’s research—a survey of over 300 North Carolina patients
subject to OPC—had revealed that eighty-three percent believed incorrectly that
the OPC order itself permitted the forcible administration of involuntary medi-
cations.51 To what extent must judges ensure that individuals subject to Kendra’s
Law understand that law’s limitations on this matter?
Other studies have begun to fill in some of the gaps in the research picture.
They suggest that, empirically, outpatient commitment can work to reduce hos-
pital readmissions and total hospital days, that patients who keep postdischarge
follow-up appointments had a far lower chance of being rehospitalized than those
who did not keep such appointments,52 but that, to succeed, a “substantial
commitment of treatment resources” is required.53 Other scholars and clinicians
have recently cautioned about the “unintended negative consequences” of extend-
ing the use of coercive techniques through OPC. Leonard Stein and Ronald
Diamond, for instance, note that mandatory OPC “may raise concerns among
other persons with mental illness that such orders could be used against them,”
For subsequent empirical investigations of the North Carolina experience, see Virginia Hiday
& Teresa Scheid-Cook, A Follow-Up of Chronic Patients Committed to Outpatient Treatment, 40
HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 52 (1989) (patients committed to outpatient treatment “significantly
more likely” than either released patients or involuntarily hospitalized patients to utilize aftercare
services and continue in treatment); Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 47, at 229 (of those outpatient
committees who participated in treatment, outpatient status “works in terms of keeping patients in
treatment and on medication, increasing compliance, permitting residence outside an institution and
social interaction outside the home, and maintaining patients in the community with few dangerous
episodes”); Gustavo Fernandez & Sylvia Nygard, Impact of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment on
the Revolving-Door Syndrome in North Carolina, 41 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 1001 (1990)
(finding statistically significant reduction in number of “revolving door” patients); Virginia Hiday
& Teresa Scheid-Cook, Outpatient Commitment for “Revolving Door” Patients, 179 J. NERV. &
MENT. DIS. 83 (1991) (outpatient commitment induces compliance and leads to treatment mainte-
nance even among “revolving door” patients); Erika King, Outpatient Civil Commitment in North
Carolina: Constitutional and Policy Concerns, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 250 (Spring 1995).
For subsequent literature, see e.g., 1 PERLIN, supra note 6, § 2C-7.3, at 491–92 n. 1379 (citing
articles).
49 Randy Borum et al, Consumer Perceptions of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 50
PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1489 (1999).
50 Id. at 1491.
51 Id. at 1490.
52 E. Anne Nelson et al, Effects of Discharge Planning and Compliance with Outpatient
Appointments on Readmission Rates, 51 PSYCHIATRIC. SERV. 885 (2000).
53 Marvin Swartz et al, Can Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Hospital Recidivism?
Findings from a Randomized Trial with Severely Mentally Ill Individuals, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1968 (1999).
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thus “frightening . . . potential clients away from the treatment system.”54 Simi-
larly, Michael Hoge and Elizabeth Grottole argue that, because OPC covers
individuals not otherwise subject to forced medication to take such medication
against their will (through reliance on the patients’ mistaken belief that medica-
tions would otherwise be forced), it thus “devalues the individuals being served,
and undermines the physician-patient relationship . . . . A strategy that relies on
patient misinformation to foster its success violates ethics principles, the integrity
of the physician-patient relationship, and the notion of informed consent.”55
The question of coercion was given a different, but very troubling, spin 4
years ago at the American Psychiatric Association national conference on pre-
Kendra’s outpatient commitment laws. There, Dr. Susan Stabinsky reported that
“most” of the mandated patients she had observed were women “forced into
treatment as a condition of getting their children back.”56 At the same meeting,
Dr. Kenneth Gilbert expressed his discomfort with the possibility that AOPC was
being used to “serv[e] the ends” of the criminal justice system.57 It is surprising
that there has been so little attention paid to this troubling data.58
Finally, commentators have begun to look at the question of funding. Stein
and Diamond are clear: “without adequate funding such a law would result in no
real improvement in the system.”59 Similarly, the National Association of State
Mental Health Program Directors has concluded: “At a minimum, if a state
decides to implement [OPC], it must allocate sufficient resources to community-
based treatment.”60
III. Forced Drugging
There is no question that the most controversial aspect of contemporary OPC
laws is the linkage between commitment and forced drugging, and it is likely that
this will be the part of Kendra’s Law and other recent laws that will receive the
most attention (both in the press and in the academic commentaries). In a
powerful—and to my mind, generally persuasive—critique from a civil libertar-
ian perspective, Steven Schwartz and Cathy Costanzo focus on outpatient com-
mitment as “an expression of the much enlarged authority which developed over
the past century to promote the health or interests of persons considered to be
mentally infirm,” and characterize it as a “significant distortion of the historical
54 Leonard Stein & Ronald Diamond, Commentary: A “Systems”-Based Alternative to Man-
datory Outpatient Treatment, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L 159, 159 (2000).
55 Michael Hoge & Elizabeth Grottole, The Case Against Outpatient Commitment, 28 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 165, 167 (2000).
56 Psychiatrists Divided Over Usefulness of Outpatient Commitment, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Sept.
4, 1998), at 12.
57 Id. at 18.
58 I address this lack of attention in Michael L. Perlin, “‘On Desolation Row’: The Blurring of
The Borders Between Civil and Criminal Mental Disability Law, and What it Means to All of Us,”
keynote address, first International Conference on Forensic Mental Health Services, Vancouver, BC,
Canada, April 2001.
59 Stein & Diamond, supra note 54, at 160.
60 Technical Report, supra note 12, at 15 (emphasis added).
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purposes and benign motivation of the parens patriae principle,”61 and, primarily,
as a “guise for substantially modifying the criteria for state-imposed psychiatric
intervention.”62 Additionally, Professor Susan Stefan has “unpacked” outpatient
commitment to differentiate “traditional” outpatient commitments (premised on
least restrictive alternative constructs and conditional release schemata) from the
post-deinstitutionalization model which she characterizes as “preventive commit-
ment” (PC).63 According to Stefan, by focusing on the specter of deterioration, an
implied presumption of incompetency, and an assumed availability of treatment,64
PC “broadens the class of people subject to commitment, and expands the
conditions under which the state can intervene in a person’s life.”65
Both Stefan and Schwartz/Costanzo focus sharp criticism on precisely the
issue which is frequently seen as the linchpin of outpatient commitment’s effi-
ciency value: its use as a tool to compel medication compliance in the commu-
nity.66 Stefan characterizes forced medication as the “core of outpatient commit-
ment;”67 Schwartz and Costanzo speculate that outpatient commitment “already
has or will become synonymous with forced medications.”68 This takes on greater
importance in the context of recent literature that charges that community mental
health services have never been truly accessible to former state hospital patients,69
and of case law that holds that Community Mental Health Centers (CMHCs) have
61 Steven Schwartz & Cathy Costanzo, Compelling Treatment in the Community: Distorted
Doctrine and Violated Values, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1329, 1346–48 (1987).
62 Id. at 1404.
63 Susan Stefan, Preventive Commitment: The Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11 MENT. & PHYS. DIS.
L. REP. 288 (1987).
64 Id. at 288-91.
65 Id. at 296.
66 Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note 61, at 1384 (“Thus, the issue is not competency but
preference: when a person chooses not to take the drugs which a psychiatrist deems necessary, and
some form of psychological deterioration is predicted to follow, coercion is considered desirable”)
(footnote omitted). See also id. at 1383 n.245, quoting, in part, Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 44,
at 149:
Pychiatrists forthrightly acknowledge that the most convincing clinical rationale for invol-
untary community care is to force resistant patients to take their drugs. Clinicians argue that
outpatient commitment is ideal for a patient who can be maintained in remission with
medication but who does not take it voluntarily or consistently. They contend that continued
court supervision is justified by the patient’s history of repeated psychotic episodes when
medication is discontinued.
Compare 1 PERLIN, supra note 6, § 2B-5.2 (2d ed. 1998).
67 Stefan, supra note 63, at 294. See also John La Fond, The Homeless Mentally Ill: Is Coercive
Psychiatry the Answer? (paper presented at annual meeting of American Association of Law
Schools, January 1990, San Francisco, CA), manuscript at 10 (in outpatient settings, “[d]rugs—with
all their risks—will undoubtedly be the treatment of choice”). See generally for an analysis in one
jurisdiction, Elizabeth Furlong, Coercion in the Community: The Application of Rogers Guardian-
ship to Outpatient Commitment, 21 N. ENG. J. CIV. & CRIM. CONFINEMENT 485 (1995).
68 Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note 61, at 1368. See, e.g., In re K.B., 562 N.W. 2d 208 (Mich.
App. 1997) (outpatient returned to involuntary hospitalization status after she refused to take
antipsychotic medication).
69 See E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY
ILL 138–60 (1988).
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the right to refuse admission to state hospital outpatients.70 If OPC’s success
depends on the dedication of CMHCs to “making [it] work,” the concern that such
facilities may pay only “lip service” to the status may force a reconsideration of
OPC as a tool by which to enforce community drugging.71
One of the implicit “givens” of the contemporary OPC debate is that persons
with mental illness are not competent—in a lay sense, if not in a legal sense—to
decide whether to self-medicate in a community setting.72 And this assumption
has rarely been challenged.73 But, important conceptual light has been shed on
this entire murky area of the law by the publication of research by the MacArthur
Foundation’s Network on Mental Health and the Law (the “Network”).74 For the
past decade, the Network has conducted an extensive study of three areas that are
essential to an informed understanding of mental disability law: competence,
coercion, and risk.75 The competence aspect of the research 76 reports on the
researchers’ attempts to develop a reliable and valid information base upon which
to address clinical and policy questions about mentally disabled persons’ ability
to provide informed consent to treatment.77
Among the Network’s findings of significance to the question that I address
in this article are the conclusions that mental patients are not always incompetent
70 Rhode Island Dep’t of Mental Health v. R.B., 549 A.2d 1028, 1031 (R.I. 1988).
71 Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 47, at 230–31. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Reading
the Supreme Court’s Tea Leaves: Predicting Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to
Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY 37, 50–51 (1991). On the relationship
between CMHCs and outpatient systems, see Wilk, Implications of Involuntary Outpatient Com-
mitment for Community Mental Health Agencies, 58 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 580 (1988).
72 See 1 PERLIN, supra note 6, §2C-7.3, at 497–98; Perlin, supra note 20, at 1049.
73 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging Lions and
Wastin’ Time”? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in
Individual Right To Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 114, 133–34 (1996):
Judges regularly decide involuntary civil commitment cases not under the terms of the
underlying statutes, but rather on the basis of their perceptions of whether patients will
self-medicate in the community.
See also, Perlin, supra note 71, at 52–59; Theresa Scheid-Cook, Commitment of the Mentally Ill to
Outpatient Treatment, 23 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 173, 180–81 (1987).
74 Michael L. Perlin, “Make Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric
Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947, 973 (1997).
75 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: A Summary of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study and
an Introduction to the Special Theme, 2 PSYCHOL, PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 3 (1996). See also, e.g.,
Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, Values and Limits of the MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 167 (1996); Ronald Roesch, Stephen D. Hart, Patricia A. Zapf,
Conceptualizing and Assessing Competency to Stand Trial: Implications And Applications of the
MacArthur Treatment Competence Model, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 96 (1996); Susan Stefan,
Race, Competence Testing, and Disability Law: A Review of the MacArthur Competence Research,
2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 31 (1996).
76 See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study. I: Mental Illness and Competence To Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 105
(1995); Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. II: Measures of
Abilities Related to Competence To Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995);
Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III: Abilities
of Patients To Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995).
77 Winick, supra note 75 at 3.
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to make rational decisions and that mental patients are not inherently more
incompetent than nonmentally ill patients.78 In fact, on “any given measure of
decisional abilities, the majority of patients with schizophrenia did not perform
more poorly than other patients and nonpatients.”79 In short, the presumption in
which courts have regularly engaged—that there is both a de facto and de jure
presumption of incompetency to be applied to medication decision making80—
appears to be based on an empirical fallacy: psychiatric patients are not neces-
sarily more incompetent than nonmentally ill persons to engage in independent
medication decision making.
If this is so, then it appears that the Stefan/Schwartz & Costanzo critique is
largely accurate, and that statutes that suggest a de facto presumption of incom-
petency are not merely likely unconstitutional, but are also based on a critical
misreading of the empirical data.
IV. Kendra’s Law
With this as backdrop, I will turn my attention to Kendra’s Law,81 and first,
consider briefly the legislative findings.82 The legislature makes clear its intent in
passing this act:
The legislature finds that there are mentally ill persons who are capable of
living in the community with the help of family, friends and mental health
professionals, but who, without routine care and treatment, may relapse and
become violent or suicidal, or require hospitalization. The legislature further finds
that there are mentally ill persons who can function well and safely in the
community with supervision and treatment, but who without such assistance, will
relapse and require long periods of hospitalization. 83
Under Kendra’s Law, a court may order a person to submit to assisted
outpatient treatment if the court finds that the patient
• is at least 18 years of age, and;
• suffers from a mental illness; and,
• is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision, as deemed
by a clinical determination; and, has a history of noncompliance with treat-
ments that has resulted in one or more seriously violent acts, threats of violence
or attempted violence, toward self or others within the last 48 months, or which
has resulted in a hospitalization or receipt of mental health services at a
correctional facility at least twice within the last 36 months—excluding the
period of hospitalization or incarceration immediately prior to the filing of the
petition; and,
78 Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 73, at 120 (discussing research in Grisso & Appelbaum, supra
note 75).
79 Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 76, at 169.
80 On this presumption in general, see Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 137 (1996).
81 Kendra’s Law was originally enacted as 1999 NY S.B. 5762.
82 Perlin, supra note 74, at 948–50.
83 1999 NY S.B. 5762, § 2.
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• is unlikely to voluntarily participate in treatment; and,
• will likely benefit from treatment and needs such treatment in order to prevent
behavior likely to result in serious harm to the patient or others.84
Court proceedings are initiated by petitions. Potential petitioners include
parents, spouses, persons with whom the subject resides, children, siblings, a
qualified treating psychiatrist, or a probation or parole officer charged with
supervising the individual.85 The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit of
a physician—not the petitioner—who attests either that he or she has examined
the patient within 10 days and recommends assisted outpatient treatment, or that
the physician has been unable to examine the patient because of non-cooperation
by the patient and that “such physician has reason to suspect that the subject of the
petition meets the criteria for assisted outpatient treatment . . .”86
The statute provides for a hearing on notice to the patient/respondent who is
entitled to counsel87 at which the physician submitting the affidavit must testify,88
present a treatment plan, and establish that it is the “least restrictive” alternative
available.89 The court may also order an involuntary examination of the respon-
dent.90
After the hearing, the court may order the subject of the petition to receive
assisted outpatient treatment for an initial period of no greater than six months.91
Before issuing this order, however, the court must find that the clear and con-
vincing evidence establishes that the subject meets the criteria for assisted
outpatient treatment and that there is no appropriate or feasiblely less restrictive
alternative.92
Again, the most controversial aspect of Kendra’s Law deals with enforced
medication. The court’s order may also require the patient to self-administer
psychotropic drugs or accept the administration of such drugs by authorized
personnel as part of an assisted outpatient treatment program,93 but may not order
treatment that has not been recommended by the examining physician and
included in the written treatment plan.94 Such treatment may be ordered for
periods of up to 1 year.95
One issue that has arisen in other OPC jurisdictions is the availability of
contempt as a remedy for noncompliant patients. For instance, in two Indiana
cases, outpatients were held by trial courts to be in criminal contempt for failing
to adhere to medication regimens. In one, the appellate court found that the trial
84 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (C).
85 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (E)(1) (I–VII).
86 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (E) (3) (II).
87 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (G), (H) (1).
88 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (H) (2).
89 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (H) (4).
90 N.Y. MENT. HYG . L. § 9.60 (H) (3).
91 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (J) (2).
92 Id.
93 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (J) (4).
94 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (J) (1)-(4).
95 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (K).
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court erred in so doing without determining whether the patient’s conduct was
“willful [or] a manifestation of mental illness.”96 In the other, after an interme-
diate appellate court affirmed the lower court’s finding where patient’s counsel
expressly stated that the refusal was “willful and voluntary,”97 the state supreme
court reversed, holding that the trial court had no authority either to order the
patient to take medication as an outpatient or to hold him in contempt for refusing
to do so.98
But under Kendra’s Law, a patient who fails or refuses to comply with a
treatment plan authorized by the court cannot be held in contempt of court.99 The
only recourse available is if a physician finds such person to be in need of
involuntary admission to a hospital, pursuant to MENTAL HYG. L. § 9.27, or in
need of “immediate observation, care and treatment pursuant” to § 9.39 or
§ 9.40.100 Such an individual can be transported to a hospital and held up to 72
hr to determine if he or she is in need of “involuntary care and treatment.”101 The
statute specifically provides, however, that “an order of assisted outpatient treat-
ment shall not be grounds for involuntary civil commitment . . . ”102
V. Unanswered Questions
What questions are left unanswered by this law? There are many, but I believe
that this is a helpful sample of those that require clarification and/or resolution:
1. Its relationship to other New York law: What is the relationship between
Kendra’s Law and other New York OPC legislation, specifically the
Bellevue pilot program authorized by Mental Hygiene Law § 9.61?103
An exhaustive study of the Bellevue program found little outcome
difference between individuals who participated in that program and a
control group (although the authors of the study noted that several
contextual factors, including sample size and lack of enforcement mech-
anisms, “constrain the conclusions that can be drawn from these
data”);104 how significant are these results to a Kendra’s law analysis?
2. The implications of “widening the net”: What are the implications of
“widening the universe of persons who are potentially subject to com-
mitment, the state must then take on the added burden of creating a
96 Matter of Utley, 565 N.E.2d 1152, 1156–57 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming judgment
because patient did not attack underlying commitment order).
97 Matter of Tarpley, 566 N.E.2d 71, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), compare id. at 77, 78 (Sullivan,
J., dissenting) (counsel’s concession does not “exclude the very real possibility, if not probability,
that the refusal was induced by Tarpley’s severe delusions and withdrawal from reality”).
98 Matter of Tarpley, 581 N.E.2d 1251, 1252 (Ind. 1991), reh’g denied (1992).
99 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (N).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.61.
104 Henry Steadman et al, Assessing the New York City Involuntary Outpatient Commitment
Pilot Program, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 330, 335 (2001).
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system which is capable of absorbing the additional committees”?105
Although this means providing extra funds for extra lawyers, mental
health professionals and expert witnesses, the proposed legislation has
no funding provisions for such system participants. Section 47.03 of the
MENTAL HYGIENE LAW was amended to authorize the commissioner of
mental health to make grants to provide medication to persons subject to
Kendra’s Law106 and to develop plans by which medications can be
prescribed and administered,107 but these grants are apparently to come
from existing funds, as the law specifies “within amounts appropriated
therefore.”108
3. Time period allocations: How significant is the short amount of time (3
days) which counsel is given to prepare cases.109 The problems here
may be exacerbated because the persons subject to Kendra hearings are
not yet in a hospital setting at the time the petition is filed, and thus are
“much harder to track down,”110 leading to the possibility that vigorous
advocacy—always a problem in cases involving persons with serious
mental disabilities—may be impossible.111 Interestingly, Dr. Howard
Telson—a clinical assistant professor of psychiatry at New York Uni-
versity—concurred, saying that the Kendra’s Law petition and hearing
process will be more “cumbersome” because it deals with individuals
outside the hospital system.112
4. The state’s track record: How relevant is the state’s shaky track record
in the creation of outpatient facilities and services?113 John Gresham,
senior litigation counsel at Lawyers for the Public Interest, has said that
the petitions “were an imperfect way to help patients, and that petition
filings and court hearings may divert funds and attention away from
hospitals.”114 Again, the National Association of State Mental Health
Program Directors has concluded: “It is clear that [OPC] will not
accomplish its objectives without a strong community-based service
provision system.”115
5. Implications of hearings in absentia: What are the logistical problems
that flow from the trial court’s ability to hold the hearing in the subject’s
105 Keri Gould, Is Kendra’s Law the Answer? No, 222. N.Y.L.J. (May 19, 1999), at 2.
106 1999 N.Y.S.B. 5762, § 15(a).
107 Id., § 15 (b), (c).
108 Id., § 15(a).
109 Yael Schacher, Courts, Lawyers Are Gearing Up to Handle Kendra’s Law Hearings, 222.
N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 30, 1999), at 1.
110 Id. at 6.
111 See e.g, Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel
in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992)
112 Schacher, supra note 109, at 1.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Technical Report, supra note 12, at 15 (emphasis added).
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absence if “the subject of the petition does not appear at the hearing, and
appropriate attempts to elicit the attendance of the subject have failed,
the court may conduct the hearing in such subject’s absence”?116 If the
subject is homeless, and thus is not susceptible to service, of what value
could such a hearing in absentia have?
6. Relationship to the Americans with Disabilities Act: What are the
implications of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Supreme
Court’s 1999 decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,117 qualifiedly affirming a
lower court decision finding a right to community treatment for certain
state hospital patients?118
7. ”Blurring” of borderlines. What “blurring” issues are raised when a
forensic facility becomes the “Kendra’s locus”?119 In a recent oral
presentation, I focused on this “blur,”120 and I believe it is an issue in
need of far more attention by all participants in the mental disability law
system. What expertise, for instance, do parole officers have in linking
up inpatient treatment failure to medication noncompliance? In fact,
116 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (H) (1).
117 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
118 See PERLIN, supra note 4; see also, Michael L. Perlin, “I Ain’t Gonna Work on Maggie’s
Farm No More”: Institutional Segregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and the Promise of
Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 53 (2000); Perlin supra note 1; Michael L. Perlin, “Their
Promises of Paradise”: Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitional “Least Restrictive
Alternative” Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOUSTON L. REV. 999 (2000).
119 See Perlin, supra note 58.
For several months, the AOPC Office in Steuben County was housed in the county jail. The
Monroe County (Rochester) Office shares space with the county Social/Legal Clinic, respon-
sible for the processing of incompetency to stand trial evaluations. Personal communication
with David Putney, manager, Assisted Outpatient Treatment Office, Rochester, NY (March
5, 2001). For several months, the Erie County (Buffalo) Office was housed in the Erie County
Jail. Personal communication with Glen Liebman, NY State Office of Mental Health, Albany,
NY (March 6, 2001).
120 See Perlin, supra note 58, at 5–6 (footnotes omitted):
The proliferation of so-called assisted outpatient commitment (AOPC) statutes—of which
New York’s Kendra’s Law is the most well-known example—and of sexually violent
predator acts (SVPA)—of which New Jersey’s Megan’s Law is often seen as the exemplar
but which has been subject to Supreme Court scrutiny elsewhere in the cases of Kansas v.
Hendricks and the Washington case of Seling v. Young—have blurred the borderline between
civil and criminal mental disability law in some very troubling and problematic ways, and
threaten to make this are of the law even more pretextual than it currently is. Laws such as
these enforce social control in punitive ways under the guise of the beneficence of civil
commitment. Although the universes of individuals subject to statutes such as Kendra’s Law
and Megan’s Law appear quite different—in the first instance, persons not subject to the
inpatient involuntary civil commitment power but who may be in danger of deterioration in
the absence of forced treatment; in the second, persons who have been charged and/or
convicted of violent sexual offenses who are targeted as potentially recidivistic pedophiles—
there are important, and troubling, points in common in the structures of these two kinds of
laws. Moreover, they both demonstrate comfort with a system in which many functions of
civil and criminal mental disability law merge. Remarkably, no one, until now, has com-
mented on this phenomenon.
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how can this link be “proven” in any case? And to what extent is this
connected to the “blur” issue?
8. Role of other “players”: Are there sufficient “authorized personnel”121
in New York’s many sparsely-populated, rural counties to assure that
ordered medication is administered? Say a patient resists assisted out-
patient treatment because of a prior negative reaction to antipsychotic
medication or a fear of permanent and irreversible side effects (a fear
which has led the United States Supreme Court to conclude that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty clause is implicated in drug side-effect
cases).122 What will the outcome of such hearings be? And suppose that
a patient asks for an independent psychiatric expert. Kendra’s Law
provides a right to counsel123 but there is no right to an independent
expert. In Goetz v. Crosson,124 the Second Circuit held that the due
process clause did not require the appointment of a psychiatrist in every
involuntary civil commitment case,125 but added:
Some proceedings may present a need for independent psy-
chiatric testimony in addition to that offered by the state to ensure
an accurate decision. As a practical matter such proceedings are
limited to cases in which the presiding judge determines that the
record leaves unexplored or unanswered questions and that ad-
ditional psychiatric testimony is necessary. In such cases, the
individual’s interests in both freedom and self-protection are
directly affected, and the failure to provide such testimony may
implicate due process concerns.126
Are Kendra’s Law cases such cases? Might some Kendra’s Law cases be such
cases? And, if they are, who will pay the bills?
9. Liability issues: What are the liability implications if a county fails to
pursue a Kendra’s Law order? How, in general, are tort liability issues—
especially Tarasoff issues127—to be resolved in Kendra’s Law cases?
10. Those potentially covered by Kendra’s Law: What about a prisoner who
had been convicted on a count of mail fraud or state tax evasion who is
121 See N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60(I)(1).
122 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229–30 (1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,
134 (1992). See also infra accompanying notes 130–138.
123 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60(G).
124 967 F. 2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
125 Id. at 34.
126 Id.
127 Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of University of California, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (“duty
to protect”).
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prescribed Xanax while in a prison setting?128 Does he qualify as a
potential Kendra patient? Should he?
11. Financial allocation issues: How will the counties and the state sort out
the difficult and important issues of “who pays what”? This latter
question has been the topic of at least one court decision129 but final
disposition of this issue is far from resolved.
12. Right to refuse medication issues: Then, finally, there are the constitu-
tional issues, specifically those around the question of forced treatment.
This is what the new law says:
A physician who testifies [in an outpatient commitment hear-
ing] shall state the facts which support the allegation that the
subject meets each of the criteria for assisted outpatient treat-
ment, and the treatment is the least restrictive alternative, the
recommended assisted outpatient treatment, and the rationale for
the recommended assisted outpatient treatment. If the recom-
mended assisted outpatient treatment includes medication, such
physician’s testimony shall describe the types or classes of med-
ication which should be authorized, shall describe the beneficial
and detrimental physical and mental effects of such medication,
and shall recommend whether such medication should be self-
administered or administered by authorized personnel.130
To what extent can this be rationalized with the New York Court of Appeals
decision in Rivers v. Katz,131 articulating the broadest right-to-refuse-treatment
decision in any American jurisdiction (premised exclusively on state common and
constitutional law). Rivers ordered—in most cases132—a counseled, due process
decision with respect to proposed treatment before the drugs may be administered
pursuant to the State’s parens patriae power.”133 The court restated the “firmly
128 I ask my Mental Health Law students to assume that Tony Soprano is serving time in a New
York prison at a time when he is still under Dr. Melfi’s care, and continues to take his prescribed
Prozac. He finishes the prescribed drugs, and asks the hospital physician to renew his prescription.
Does this qualify him as a potential Kendra’s Law patient? The debate on this is always lively . . .
129 See infra note 150.
130 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (H)(4).
131 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986).
132 Where a patient presents a danger to self or others or “engages in dangerous or potentially
dangerous conduct within the institution,” the state may be warranted, under police power grounds,
in administering antipsychotic medication over the patient’s objections. Id., 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
“The most obvious example of this is an emergency situation, such as when there is imminent
danger to a patient or others in the immediate vicinity.” Id. (citation omitted).
133 Id. at 78. The court added that these principles were also recognized by the state legislature,
citing to N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§2504 & 2805-d; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. §4401-a, and 10
N.Y.C.R.R. §405.25(a)(7).
The cited sections provide for informed consent of adult individuals in situations involving
“medical, dental, health and hospital services,” N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(I) (1985); set
out the elements of and defenses to a medical malpractice claim based on an alleged lack of
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established” and “faithfully adhered to” common-law principles134 that “every
individual of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his body’”135 and to control the course of his medical treatment.136 In
the case of competent patients, this “fundamental” right—coextensive with the
patient’s liberty interest protected by the state constitution’s due process
clause137—must be honored “even though the recommended treatment may be
beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient’s life.”138
How can the breadth of the Rivers case be reconciled with the forced
treatment aspects of Kendra’s Law? This is something that will and must be
addressed (since, left unresolved, it would result in the anomalous situation of
in-patients having many more rights than out-patients) in the coming years.
Although Kendra’s Law has withstood its first Rivers challenge at a trial court
level in the recent case of Matter of Urcuyo,139 this is far from a settled issue.
Involuntary commitment is not proof of incapacity to make such treatment
decisions,140 and Kendra’s Law states that a determination of commitability for
outpatient treatment “shall not be construed as or deemed to be a determination
that such patient is incapacitated . . . .”141 Asks Professor Keri Gould, one of
Kendra’s Law’s most important critics: “How then, can a court order for invol-
untary medication be enforced against a competent outpatient committee without
an explicit constitutional violation?”142
As a result, we are forced to consider the overarching anomaly in all
informed consent, id. §2805-d(1)-(4); set the standard upon which to assess a motion for
judgment at the end of plaintiff’s case in such an action, N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. §4401-a
(1987); and mandate that hospitals establish written policies affording patients the right to
“refuse treatment to the extent permitted by law and to be informed of the medical
consequences of [their] action,” 10 N.Y.C.R.R. §405.25(a)(7) (1986).
134 Rivers, 504 N.Y.S. 2d at 78.
135 Id., quoting, in part, Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914) (Cardozo, J.).
136 Rivers, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78, citing, inter alia, Matter of Storar, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Schloendorff, supra. Storar was a so-called “right-to-die” case,
holding that where an elderly patient, prior to becoming incompetent, had consistently expressed his
wish not to have his life prolonged by medical means if there were no hope for recovery, it was
proper for the court to approve discontinuance of a respirator on which he was being maintained in
a permanent vegetative state.
137 Rivers, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. See Cooper v. Morin, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 175 (N.Y. 1979), cert.
denied sub nom. Lombard v. Cooper, 446 U.S. 984 (1980) (applying due process clause of state
constitution to question of adequacy of jail conditions; cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)).
138 Rivers, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78, citing Storar, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273:
Added the Court: In our system of a free government, where notions of individual autonomy
and free choice are cherished, it is the individual who must have the final say in respect to
decisions regarding his medical treatment in order to insure that the greatest possible
protection is accorded his autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference with the
furtherance of his own desires . . . . This right extends equally to mentally ill persons who are
not to be treated as persons of lesser status or dignity because of their illness.
504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
139 714 N.Y.S. 2d 862 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
140 Rivers, 504 N.Y.S. 2d at 78–79.
141 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. L. § 9.60 (O).
142 Gould, supra note 105, at 2.
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involuntary civil commitment law - that while only a handful of reported invol-
untary civil commitment cases have ever frontally considered right to refuse
treatment claims, courts routinely weigh experts’ predictions of a patient’s po-
tential refusal to take antipsychotic medication in a community setting as the most
probative evidence on the question of whether involuntary civil commitment is
warranted, even in jurisdictions that have broad right-to-refuse decisions in
place.143 What if a person subject to Kendra’s Law had been successful in a
Rivers action while an inpatient?144 Would that be admissible in a determination
of whether such a person is likely to fail to comply with assisted outpatient
treatment?145
In short, there is a host of difficult questions—policy questions, financial
questions, legal questions, treatment questions, political questions—that we have
not addressed through the courts or other institutions. Until these questions are
seriously and thoughtfully considered, we will not be able to resolve important
core Kendra’s Law issues.
V. First Cases
Since Kendra’s Law was enacted, a handful of cases have touched on its
scope.146 The most important of these is Matter of Urcuyo.147 The trial court in
Urcuyo upheld Kendra’s Law against a Rivers-based challenge, because Kendra’s
Law did not “require the forcible administration of medication,”148 and similarly
rejected an equal protection challenge, reasoning that “that the different treatment
for assisted outpatient subjects as opposed to [alleged incapacitated persons] and
involuntarily committed psychiatric patients is warranted.”149 Justice Cutrona
concluded:
143 Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 625, 628 (1993).
144 See e.g., 2 PERLIN, supra note 6, § 3B-7.2b, at 274-75 nn. 926-27 (2d ed. 1999) (citing
Rivers cases).
145 Compare N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60(N).
146 For the first appellate cases decided under this law, see Application of Manhattan Psychi-
atric Center, 728 N.Y.S. 2d 37 (A.D. 2001) (question for the court hearing petition for assisted
outpatient treatment not whether the patient should be released, but whether he should be released
with or without an outpatient order; hospital must show that patient cannot be left to his own devices
and must be assisted in obtaining outpatient treatment after release), discussed in Anderson,
Kendra’s Law Restricts Judge, N.Y.L.J. (July 27, 2001), at A1, and Matter of South Beach
Psychiatric Center, 727 N.Y.S. 2d 149 (A.D. 2001) (statutory provision requiring that patient have
a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental illness that has at least twice within the
last 36 months been a significant factor in necessitating hospitalization excludes the time-period
during which a person was hospitalized immediately preceding the filing of the petition for assisted
outpatient treatment).
For recent scholarly commentaries, see e.g., Ilissa Watnik, A Constitutional Analysis of
Kendra’s Law: New York’s Solution for Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1181 (2001); Jennifer Gutterman, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to
Kendra’s Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401 (2000).
147 714 N.Y.S. 2d 862 (Supreme Ct., Nassau Cty. 2000).
148 Id. at 868.
149 Id. at 873.
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Clearly, the state has a compelling interest in taking measures to prevent these
patients who pose such a high risk from becoming a danger to the community and
themselves. Kendra’s Law provides the means by which society does not have to
sit idly by and watch the cycle of decompensation, dangerousness and hospital-
ization continually repeat itself. Moreover, as previously discussed, Kendra’s Law
is narrowly tailored to achieve these goals within the framework of the involuntary
and emergency commitment procedures of the Mental Hygiene Law.
In conclusion, for all of the foregoing reasons, respondents’ motion for a
declaration that Mental Hygiene Law 9.60 is unconstitutional absent a requirement
that a respondent lacks the capacity to make a reasoned treatment decision before
an Assisted Outpatient Treatment order can be granted, is denied.150
Only one other reported case has discussed medication issues in a Kendra’s
law context, albeit in dicta. There, in In re Conticchio,151 a guardianship appli-
cation, the court sought to reconcile Kendra’s Law and the Rivers decision in this
way:
The recently passed legislation known as Kendra’s law . . . is based on the dangers
that can arise from schizophrenics and other mentally disturbed persons who cease
or refuse to take their necessary medication. While said law is apparently based
more on the State’s police power (see Rivers . . . ), it reemphasizes the importance
of not permitting interruptions in the treatment of such individuals.152
150 Id.
In addition to Urcuyo, a few other cases also provide a window into the attitudes of the trial
judges to whom Kendra’s Law dockets have been assigned. In Matter of Arden Hill Hospital, the
court held that the county was responsible for costs of the patient’s outpatient mental health services
that were not covered by Medicaid or insurance. 703 N.Y.S. 2d 902 (Orange Cty. 2000) In relatively
strong language, the trial judge (Justice Bivona) read the law as reflecting a legislative finding that
“even if a hospital operates an outpatient treatment program that this does not absolve the director
of community services’ responsibility for operation of such a program,” id. at 905, flatly rejecting
the county’s arguments that the hospital should bear the responsibility for any costs, and finding it
to be “solely” the county director of community services to be responsible for provision of services,
id. at 906.
In other cases, courts have variously found that a patient could be ordered to be evaluated by
a physician without a prior hearing, Matter of Longo, 715 N.Y.S. 2d 833 (Supreme Ct., Monroe Cty.
2000), and that the commission of a violent act during the patient’s present psychiatric hospital-
ization could be used to satisfy the “one or more violent acts” criteria of the law. Matter of
Weinstock, 2001 WL 290238 (Supreme Ct. 2001). This case was decided by Justice Cutrona, the
same judge who decided Urcuyo, supra.
In cases that have turned on questions of procedure, one court in Queens County has found a
doctor’s conclusory statements in an affidavit insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of the
law (and that this failure was a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect), In re Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S. 2d 853
(Queens Cty. 2000), and another one has found that the physician–patient evidentiary privilege did
not prevent a patient’s treating psychiatrist from submitting an affidavit or giving testimony in
support of the director’s petition, In re Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S. 2d 804 (Queens Cty. 2000). A King’s
County case has concluded that “any instances of non-compliance with treatment, no matter how
recent, would be relevant in determining whether or not a patient will be compliant in the future.”
In re Dailey, 713 N.Y.S. 2d 660 (Supreme Ct. 2000). This case was also decided by Justice Cutrona,
the same judge who decided Urcuyo and Weinstock, supra.
151 696 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (Nassau Cty. 1999).
152 Id. at 774.
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Conticchio has not been cited in subsequent cases, so it is not clear what impact,
if any, this will have on actual Kendra’s Law cases on this question.
In a non-Kendra’s Law case that was ancillary to the criminal prosecution of
Andrew Goldstein—the individual subsequently convicted of murdering Kendra
Webdale, after whom Kendra’s Law was named—another court, in the course of
a decision ordering the production of records from a private hospital, looked at the
language of Kendra’s Law to conclude that, in addition to establishing an OPC
plan, the law was geared to “improve coordination of care for mentally ill persons
living in the community, expand the use of conditional release in psychiatric
hospitals, and improve dissemination of information between and among health
providers and general hospital emergency rooms.”153
What about in non-reported cases? At an Association of the Bar of the City
of New York panel discussion in 2000, it was revealed that, of the 163 petitions
granted in Kendra’s Law cases throughout New York state, 131 of them arose in
New York City.154 In responding to this information, Westchester County Su-
preme Court Justice John P. DiBlasi, characterized this large number of petitions
granted in New York is a “cause for concern,” especially since the burden of proof
required to make out a prima facie case under Kendra’s Law is so high.155 Justice
DiBlasi said he was worried that judges—who may be motivated more by
protecting the public rather than compelling patients to get needed treatment—
may decide to err on the side of caution.156
153 City of New York v. Bleuler Psychotherapy Center, Inc., 695 N.Y.S. 2d 903 (N.Y. Cty.
1999).
154 Yael Schacher, Experts Disagree Over the Success of Kendra’s Law, N.Y.L.J. (June 30,
2000), at 1. As of February 19, 2001, 591 petitions had been granted in New York City, 22 were
denied, and 162 were pending. Memorandum, Paul McNicholas, Office of Management Information
Systems, to Isaac Monserrate, NYC Department of Mental Health (Feb. 9, 2001) (on file with
author) (“McNicholas Memo”).
155 It has been reported to me that county officials in upstate New York have been criticized
by state officials for the relatively low numbers of Kendra’s petitions that have been filed.
156 Schachter, supra. note 155, at 1–2. One of the interesting unreported pieces of Kendra’s
data is the disparity in New York as to the contestation of Kendra petitions as between different
counties. A close study of the data reveals that this cannot be divided easily—as one might
imagine—simply between rural and urban areas, or between upstate and downstate. To some extent,
the variation in Kendra’s Law statistics appears to be a function of venue. Those counties that
comprise the Second Department—Brooklyn, Queens, Nassau, Suffolk, and a few others—have,
disproportionately, been responsible for far more contested applications than those in the other three
departments combined. There have, of course, been many petitions filed in the other boroughs of
New York as well. See “McNicholas Memo,” supra note 154.
Why has the Second Department been so markedly involved? Sources in that office tell me that
their primary concern is the way the law has been implemented: that it may potentially undermine
the therapeutic alliance (by undermining individuals’ sense of self-esteem and self-importance), see
e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum & Stephen K. Hoge, The Right to Refuse Treatment: What the Research
Reveals, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 279, 291 (1986); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health
Treatment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 17 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99, 112 (1994), that
due process issues are often slighted, see e.g., Douglas Stransky, Civil Commitment and the Right
to Refuse Treatment: Resolving Disputes from a Due Process Perspective, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413,
443 (1996), that the question of the stage in the process at which the right to counsel attaches has
not been operationally resolved, that police officers can be improperly utilized in the apprehension
of allegedly non-compliant Kendra’s patients (a subset of cases in which due process is frequently
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VI. Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives
What are the TJ implications of Kendra’s Law?157 To be sure, the law is a law
professor’s dream final exam hypo: what to say about a law that, on its surface,
seeks to make mental health services available to an important subset of mentally
ill persons—those in danger of deteriorating and running the risk of requiring
reinstitutionalization if they do not receive aggressive treatment—but which,
when examined more carefully, threatens important civil rights/civil liberties
values and perhaps, promises what it cannot possibly deliver. Dr. Howard Owens,
for example, is pessimistic: “Lacking both the adequate funding to provide
enhanced care and any mechanism for enforcing the court’s commitment order.
The new law is unlikely to achieve its stated intention . . . ”158
In the most comprehensive, scholarly and exhaustive defense of AOPC laws,
Professor Ken Kress argues forcefully:
. . . In many cases of actual or threatened violence by individuals with mental
disorders, an assisted outpatient treatment statute would have protected both the
victims and the perpetrator, thereby enhancing public safety and welfare. While
absent, although such cases of alleged non-compliance may result from something as benign as
misdelivered clinic appointment notifications, see e.g., Henry Steadman et al., Explaining the
Increased Arrest Rate Among Mental Patients: The Changing Clientele of State Hospitals, 135 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 816, 819–20 (1978) (discussing number of explanations for increasing arrest rate
among former mental patients and concluding that composition of state hospitals reflects an
inpatient population with higher likelihood of post-release arrest); see generally, Ellen Steury,
Criminal Defendants with Psychiatric Impairment: Prevalence, Probabilities, and Rates, 84 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOL. 352 (1993)), that court orders may have an inevitably self-generating coercive effect
(see e.g., Margaret Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C.L. REV.
407 (1998)), (and the fact that courts logically and accurately expect that individuals will want to
comply with court orders, see e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First
Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 111 (1990); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 912 (1990)), that the extent of drug side-effects may be ignored, see
generally, 2 PERLIN, supra note 6, § 3B-1 et seq., that the commitment net may be extended too
broadly, see Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of
Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 125 (1991), that Kendra’s Law conflicts with the heart of the
Rivers decision, see supra text accompanying notes 130–38, and, finally, the way that the law
depends, inevitably, on the good will of those vested with its enforcement. Interestingly, this latter
topic appears in the law review literature only in articles dealing with questions of international law.
See e.g., Martha Jean Baker, The Different Voice: Japanese Norms of Consensus and “Cultural”
Feminism, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 133, 135 (1997); Katherine M. Culliton Finding a Mechanism
to Enforce Women’s Right to State Protection From Domestic Violence in The Americas, 34 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 507, 529 n. 101 (1993).
This information reifies an intuition I have had since my first contact with TJ a decade ago: that
it is impossible, in any area of mental disability law, at least, to even conceptualize TJ questions,
issues, problems and solutions, without looking closely at the role of counsel. See 1 PERLIN, supra
note 6, § 2B-1 et seq. It is probably even more critical in cases involving Kendra’s Law when so
many of the critical issues are obscured from public view.
Much of the information in this footnote comes from personal communications with Sidney
Hirschfeld, Esq., Mental Hygiene Legal Services, Mineola, NY (April 24, 2001).
157 This is a question that has been rarely addressed. But see, Howard Owens, Outpatient
Commitment Comes to New York, 42 BULLETIN, NY STATE PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Winter 1999-2000),
at 8; Susan Pollett, Has Kendra’s Law Been a Boon or a Bust?, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 23, 2000), at 1.
158 Owens, supra note 157, at 8.
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the ways in which society’s welfare will be enhanced are obvious, the perpetrator’s
welfare will be enhanced because the perpetrator will not be subject to violent
action in self defense, to criminal charges, or to agonizing remorse for his or her
actions.159
But I am not at all sure that this has happened in Kendra’s Law cases.
Kendra’s Law, in its current iteration, appears to have both therapeutic and
anti-therapeutic aspects. First, publicity about Kendra’s Law may lead some
persons with mental illness to seek needed treatment that they might not otherwise
receive. Also, Kendra’s Law is, in many ways, a less restrictive alternative to
inpatient hospitalization for certain persons with mental illness who do not
voluntarily seek treatment. Because such persons will not be subject to hospital-
ization, treatment may be more effective and the person may be more likely to
adhere to the treatment plan. It may also give the person a sense of control over
her treatment, and a sense of independence hospitalized persons may not have.
The involvement of the judicial system may, potentially, be another thera-
peutic aspect of Kendra’s Law. The fact that there is some sort of judicial
process—and the right to counsel—may eliminate some measure of inappropriate
administrative discretion, and may give some sort of assurance that the person’s
constitutional and legal rights are being upheld, and that the process is being
conducted in a fair manner.160 These outcomes certainly have potentially thera-
peutic impacts.161 Finally, a recent study of AOPC in another jurisdiction sug-
gests that such laws may significantly reduce the level of victimization of persons
with mental illness.162 If this is to be borne out in subsequent studies (the cohort
members were all participants in a program at Duke University, and thus subject
to North Carolina’s AOPC laws, not New York’s), it may prove to have great
importance to the future of AOPC elsewhere.
On the other hand, there are many aspects of Kendra’s Law that strike me as
fundamentally anti-therapeutic. The fact that none of the long list of questions that
I earlier raised163 has been resolved is extraordinarily problematic, given the
range of issues involved, and the fundamentality of those questions as to the
operation of the law and its impact on persons with mental illness. Certainly, one
of the most critical issues—once again—is that raised by the way it apparently
flies in the face of the Rivers decision 164 Although Matter of Urcuyo165 has
upheld Kendra’s Law against the first trial court-level Rivers challenge, that
159 Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for Persons with Serious
Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1269,
1283 (2000).
160 Persons with mental illness have the same innate sense of “procedural justice” as do others.
See Tyler, supra note 52, at 442–44.
161 See Perlin, Healing, supra note 3, at 415–16.
162 Virginia Hiday et al., Victimization: A Link Between Mental Illness and Violence, 24 INT’L
J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 559 (2001).
163 See supra text accompanying notes 103–45.
164 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986).
165 714 N.Y.S. 2d 862 (Sup. Ct. 2000). See supra text accompanying notes 147–50.
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decision is, to my mind, utterly unpersuasive, and in no way resolves the
Rivers-related questions raised earlier.
I am also gravely concerned about the way that Kendra’s Law blurs the
relationship between civil and criminal mental disability law. By widening the net
of persons who can come within the ambit of the public mental health system, by
investing certain prison and parole officers with putative mental health “exper-
tise,” and by making it appear to the public that there is a causal connection
between mental illness and dangerousness,166 Kendra’s Law may distort—even
further—the public’s view of persons with mental illness.
Kendra’s Law may also be too easy of an alternative to involuntary civil
commitment. Certainly, many of the persons who come within its ambit are
perceived as “undesirable,” and persons who many would rather simply see
locked away, people that they want off the street.167 Another troubling aspect of
Kendra’s Law is the fact that a treatment order can be rendered without the
individual actually being present in court.168 If the person’s presence cannot be
secured, after attempts having been made, the court may proceed without the
person being present. The statute does not define how many attempts must be
made, or what can be considered a reasonable attempt. It is vague and ambiguous,
and leads to the danger of a significant number of these Kendra’s Law treatment
orders being handed down in absentia. This raises profound antitherapeutic
implications.
Finally, the most recent broad-based studies conclude that, while there is
some evidence of improved outcomes for people with severe mental illness under
involuntary outpatient treatment, that that evidence only emerges when the court
order is combined with intensive mental health services. The study—commis-
sioned by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice on behalf of the California
legislature—concluded that, “there is no evidence that a court order alone helps
achieve compliance or good outcomes.”169
166 See Perlin, supra note 58.
167 I discuss this extensively in Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”:
Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 3, 8 (1999):
. . . [A] New York Times . . . article dealt with an ex-patient, Gerald Kerrigan, who wandered
the streets of the Upper West Side of Manhattan. Kerrigan never threatened or harmed
anybody, but he was described as “different,” “off,” “not right,” somehow. It made other
residents of that neighborhood—traditionally home to one of the nation’s most liberal voting
blocs -- nervous to have him in the vicinity, and the story focused on the response of a
community block association to his presence. The story hinted darkly that the social
“experimentation” of deinstitutionalization was somehow the villain.
. . . .Kerrigan was [seen as] emblematic of a major “social problem.” [His] story reflected the
failures of “deinstitutionalization” and demonstrated why the application of civil libertarian
concepts to the involuntary civil commitment process was a failure. . . . No one discussed
Gerald Kerrigan’s autonomy values (or the quality of life in the institution from which he was
released).
168 N.Y. MENT. HYG. L. § 9.60 (E) (3) (II).
169 http://www.rand.org/hot/Press/ca.mental.html (visited April 24, 2001).
207THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND KENDRA’S LAW
Th
is
 d
oc
um
en
t i
s c
op
yr
ig
ht
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
A
m
er
ic
an
 P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
or
 o
ne
 o
f i
ts
 a
lli
ed
 p
ub
lis
he
rs
.
Th
is
 a
rti
cl
e 
is
 in
te
nd
ed
 so
le
ly
 fo
r t
he
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
f t
he
 in
di
vi
du
al
 u
se
r a
nd
 is
 n
ot
 to
 b
e 
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
 b
ro
ad
ly
.
Conclusion
Writing over 2 years ago about Kendra’s Law, I concluded:
Kendra’s Law—like so many mental health laws170—was enacted in response to
a vivid case171 that appeared to be the inevitable outcome of flawed social policies
(or, at the least, the mis-implementation of questionable social policies). The new
law is ambitious, but leaves many questions unanswered—questions of law, of
social policy, of clinical decisionmaking and of governmental operation.172
In the time that has passed since I wrote that paper, little has happened to
change my mind. And, although there are a few therapeutic glimmers to be
sighted—if Kendra’s Law is read most optimistically—I remain convinced that it
is the wrong answer to a difficult and intractable problem.
170 On the use of the “slip-through-the-cracks” metaphor in mental health law, see Michael L.
Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 599, 635–36 (1990).
171 On the way that “a single vivid case can shape (or misshape) legislative policies in the
mental disability area,” see Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can
Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 44 (1993-94).
172 Michael L. Perlin, Outpatient Commitment: Panacea or Pandora’s Box (prepared for
presentation to the NYS Office of Court Administration Yearly Legal Update, Rochester, NY, Nov.
1999) (paper on file with author).
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